About the Conference
Classifying the Mind
Ontological, Epistemological, and Methodological Issues in the Sciences of the Mind
How Do the Sciences of the Mind Define Their Objects of Inquiry?
Scientific inquiry does not begin with observation alone. It also requires decisions about what constitutes a phenomenon, how phenomena should be distinguished from one another, and which similarities and differences are relevant to explanation.
In the sciences of the mind, these decisions are particularly consequential. Categories such as perception, memory, attention, emotion, cognition, and mental disorder structure research programmes, guide experimental investigation, and inform the interpretation of empirical findings. Yet the ontological status, epistemic justification, and methodological adequacy of these categories remain subjects of philosophical and scientific debate.
Classifying the Mind examines the foundations and consequences of these classificatory practices, bringing together philosophical analysis and empirical research to explore how the sciences of the mind identify, individuate, investigate, and explain their objects.
The Intellectual Context
Classification as a Philosophical and Scientific Problem
Classification is indispensable to scientific knowledge. Researchers must identify regularities, distinguish phenomena, establish categories, and determine which properties are relevant to explanation. Scientific classifications make it possible to organize observations, formulate hypotheses, construct models, design experiments, and generalize findings.
However, classification also raises foundational questions. What justifies treating different instances as members of the same kind? What establishes the boundaries between scientific categories? Do these boundaries correspond to objective divisions in nature, or are they partly determined by the theoretical perspectives, explanatory interests, and investigative practices of researchers?
These questions have a particular significance in the sciences of the mind, where many familiar categories have complex historical and conceptual origins. Distinctions between perception and cognition, emotion and reason, memory and imagination, or normal and pathological functioning have shaped scientific investigation for generations. Yet their familiarity does not, by itself, establish that they correspond to distinct, stable, or independently identifiable phenomena.
At the same time, scientific classifications are neither arbitrary nor merely linguistic conventions. They may capture important empirical regularities, support successful explanations, enable prediction, and guide interventions. Understanding their legitimacy therefore requires examining the relationship between conceptual frameworks, empirical evidence, explanatory objectives, and the phenomena under investigation.
The challenge is not simply to determine whether existing classifications are correct or incorrect, but to clarify the conditions under which they are scientifically informative, how they acquire their authority, and when they should be preserved, revised, or replaced.
Ontology
What Kinds of Things Are Mental Phenomena?
A central question concerns the ontological status of the categories employed in psychology, cognitive science, neuroscience, and psychiatry.
Do categories such as emotion, attention, memory, or depression identify natural kinds? Are they grounded in shared causal mechanisms, functional organization, biological properties, or patterns of relations? Alternatively, should some psychological categories be understood as pragmatic, historically contingent, relational, or context-dependent classifications?
These questions connect the philosophy of psychology with broader debates in metaphysics, philosophy of science, and philosophy of biology concerning natural kinds, essentialism, scientific realism, multiple realization, individuality, and explanatory pluralism.
They also raise problems of individuation: what makes a particular mental event or process an instance of one phenomenon rather than another? What establishes the identity of a cognitive function across individuals, developmental stages, environments, or species?
Contemporary empirical research has made these questions increasingly salient. Findings concerning neural reuse, degeneracy, distributed brain networks, and the multiple realization of functions invite reconsideration of simple correspondences between psychological categories and neural mechanisms.
Similarly, evidence of substantial variation within psychological and psychiatric categories raises questions about whether scientific kinds must be homogeneous, whether category boundaries can be flexible, and what kinds of regularities are sufficient to support explanation.
Rather than presupposing a particular answer, the conference invites critical examination of competing ontological accounts of mental phenomena and the implications of these accounts for scientific classification.
Epistemology
How Do Scientific Concepts Shape What We Know?
Scientific inquiry depends upon conceptual resources that make phenomena identifiable and intelligible. The categories through which researchers describe mental life do not merely organize established findings; they also influence which questions are asked, which observations are considered relevant, and which results become interpretable as evidence.
This raises questions about the formation, inheritance, and transformation of scientific concepts.
How did psychology acquire the categories through which it studies the mind? To what extent do contemporary scientific taxonomies preserve distinctions inherited from philosophy, everyday language, historical theories of mental faculties, or earlier experimental traditions?
How do these inherited categories influence the investigation of phenomena that may not conform to their presumed boundaries?
Debates about theory-ladenness, scientific representation, conceptual change, and epistemic values are particularly relevant here. Evidence does not enter scientific inquiry independently of the experimental systems, measurement procedures, conceptual distinctions, and explanatory frameworks through which it is produced and interpreted.
At the same time, the relationship between concepts and evidence is not necessarily one-directional. Empirical discoveries may challenge established categories, motivate conceptual revision, or support new ways of individuating phenomena.
The conference therefore examines scientific classification as an epistemic practice: one through which researchers identify objects of inquiry, stabilize phenomena, construct representations, and progressively revise their understanding of the mind.
Of particular interest is the question of how conceptual frameworks can remain responsive to empirical findings without losing the stability required for cumulative scientific investigation.
Methodology
How Do Classifications Shape Scientific Practice?
The implications of classification extend beyond philosophical analysis. Decisions about how mental phenomena are conceptualized influence the design and interpretation of empirical research.
Experimental paradigms presuppose distinctions between phenomena. Operational definitions connect theoretical constructs with observable indicators. Psychometric instruments rely upon assumptions about the attributes they seek to measure. Statistical models organize observations into variables, groups, dimensions, and distributions.
Each of these practices involves classificatory decisions.
What does it mean to measure a psychological construct? Under what conditions can an operational definition be taken to provide evidence about the phenomenon it is intended to represent? How do experimental paradigms stabilize particular interpretations of mental processes?
The sciences of the mind face additional challenges arising from individual differences, contextual variation, developmental change, and heterogeneity within established categories.
These challenges raise questions about the relationship between variation and generalization. When should variation be treated as measurement error, and when might it constitute an important feature of the phenomenon itself? How do different statistical approaches influence the identification of meaningful patterns? What forms of replication and generalization are appropriate for phenomena whose manifestations vary across individuals, situations, and time?
Developments in computational modelling, data-driven classification, network approaches, psychometrics, and experimental methodology provide new opportunities to address these problems. They also introduce further questions concerning construct validity, explanatory relevance, interpretability, and the relationship between statistical patterns and scientific kinds.
The conference invites contributions examining how methodological choices both depend upon existing classifications and contribute to their stabilization, transformation, or replacement.
The Contemporary Sciences of the Mind
When Established Categories Meet New Evidence
Recent developments across psychology, neuroscience, cognitive science, and psychiatry have renewed philosophical interest in the foundations of mental classification.
Research on distributed neural networks, functional localization, neural reuse, and degeneracy raises questions about the relationship between cognitive functions and their neural implementations.
Embodied, embedded, enactive, and extended approaches to cognition, alongside predictive processing, active inference, ecological psychology, and dynamical systems theories, offer different accounts of the organization and boundaries of cognitive processes.
In psychology and affective science, investigations of contextual variability and heterogeneity challenge assumptions about the stability and generality of some psychological categories.
In psychiatry, debates concerning diagnostic classification, dimensional models, symptom networks, and psychopathological heterogeneity raise questions about the ontological and explanatory status of mental disorders.
Comparative cognition, developmental science, and cross-cultural research introduce further challenges concerning the identification of cognitive capacities across species, developmental trajectories, and sociocultural contexts.
These developments do not necessarily converge upon a single alternative classification of the mind. Nor do they imply that established categories must invariably be abandoned.
Instead, they provide an opportunity to examine the assumptions that guide scientific investigation, evaluate the explanatory adequacy of existing taxonomies, and consider how philosophical and empirical approaches might inform their revision.
Interdisciplinary Dialogue
Bringing Philosophy and Empirical Research into Conversation
Questions about scientific classification cannot be adequately addressed within the boundaries of a single discipline.
Philosophy of science contributes analyses of scientific kinds, realism, explanation, representation, and conceptual change.
Philosophy of biology offers perspectives on individuality, variation, homology, evolutionary explanation, and the classification of complex living systems.
Philosophy of psychology and philosophy of neuroscience examine the individuation of mental functions, cognitive ontologies, mechanistic explanations, and relationships between psychological and neural descriptions.
Philosophy of psychiatry investigates diagnostic kinds, mental disorder, clinical validity, and the consequences of classificatory practices.
Empirical research in psychology, cognitive science, neuroscience, psychiatry, and related fields provides both the evidence and the practical contexts in which these philosophical questions arise.
By bringing these perspectives together, Classifying the Mind aims to encourage dialogue across disciplinary and methodological boundaries.
The conference welcomes philosophical approaches that differ in their ontological commitments, epistemological assumptions, and views concerning scientific explanation. It also welcomes theoretically informed empirical research that engages critically with the conceptual foundations of scientific investigation.
The objective is not to establish a single unified account of the mind, but to create a shared intellectual space in which competing frameworks can be examined, compared, and developed through sustained scholarly discussion.
Our Objectives
Rethinking the Foundations of Scientific Classification
Classifying the Mind aims to advance interdisciplinary reflection on the concepts and classificatory frameworks employed in the sciences of the mind.
The conference seeks to:
Examine the ontological foundations of mental categories.
Investigate what makes psychological and cognitive categories scientifically legitimate, how mental phenomena should be individuated, and what kinds of entities, processes, or patterns these categories may identify.
Investigate the epistemology of scientific classification.
Explore how concepts, theories, epistemic values, and investigative practices shape the production and interpretation of scientific knowledge.
Clarify the methodological consequences of classification.
Assess how classificatory assumptions influence experimentation, operationalisation, measurement, statistical modelling, explanation, and generalization.
Bring philosophical analysis into dialogue with empirical research.
Encourage exchange between conceptual investigation and contemporary findings in psychology, neuroscience, cognitive science, psychiatry, and related disciplines.
Consider the possibilities and limits of conceptual revision.
Examine when scientific classifications should be preserved, refined, reorganized, or replaced, and what might constitute an improvement in the scientific understanding of mental phenomena.
Support exchange between established and emerging scholars.
Provide opportunities for PhD candidates and postdoctoral researchers to present original work, engage with invited international speakers, and participate in critical interdisciplinary discussion.
Conference Format
An International Hybrid Conference
Classifying the Mind will take place on 9–11 April 2027, hosted by the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Bucharest, in a hybrid format accommodating both in-person and online participation.
The three-day programme will feature invited lectures by international scholars, peer-reviewed research presentations from PhD candidates and postdoctoral researchers, and interdisciplinary discussions.
The conference is designed to encourage sustained engagement with the philosophical and scientific problems under consideration, rather than treating presentations as isolated contributions.
Its hybrid format will facilitate participation from researchers across different institutions and geographical locations.
Further information about invited speakers, the programme, registration, and online participation arrangements will be announced on the conference website.
Presentation Duration
30 minutes
Abstract Length
Up to 300 words
Take Part in the Discussion
How Should We Classify the Mind?
The categories through which the sciences of the mind investigate their objects are indispensable to research. Yet their legitimacy, boundaries, and explanatory significance remain open to examination.
Classifying the Mind invites researchers from philosophy and the empirical sciences to engage with these questions and contribute to an interdisciplinary conversation about the foundations, practices, and future development of scientific classification.